Most cyber defences ignore the radio signals that carry wireless data, leaving a gap that attackers could exploit with cheap, off-the-shelf software-defined radios. Current network security focuses on encrypting data and authenticating users, but the physical radio layer—the actual transmission of signals through the air—remains largely unprotected. As wired-network attacks become harder, malicious actors are expected to shift their efforts to the wireless interface, where vulnerabilities in radio protocols and hardware can be exploited remotely and anonymously. The proliferation of low-cost software-defined radio platforms and open-source tools makes mounting such attacks increasingly easy. This project brings together Toshiba Research, Roke, the University of Bristol, and GCHQ to develop radios whose physical-layer behaviour can be updated in the field via software—right down to the antenna. If successful, the work would allow networks to detect and block radio-frequency cyber attacks, adapt to new threats as they emerge, and enable dynamic spectrum access, where frequency bands are allocated in real time based on demand rather than fixed licences. The consequences of not addressing this vulnerability are that the wireless channel becomes an open attack surface for everything from financial extortion to infrastructure disruption.
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Wireless access is an essential to the networks that underpin modern life, providing communications for people, vehicles, machines, infrastructure, and the wide variety of devices that will make up the Internet of Things (IoT). They will become increasingly important to support safe transportation and future healthcare. Society is increasingly vulnerable to network cyber attack, for motivations ranging from financial extortion through terrorist disruption to subversion. Cyber attacks can be mounted remotely through networks, making them attractive to malefactors who can operate safely and anonymously from anywhere in the world. Cyber defence and associated research has become critical, mainly directed at developing and rolling out technical encryption and authentication measures in the network protocols and embedding the essential processes in organisations. Nevertheless exploits continue as attackers discover new vulnerabilities that were not considered in the system design or arise through imperfect implementations. Fixing these requires updating both functionality and credentials of the network elements as threats emerge. By contrast cyber-attack via the wireless interface, exploiting vulnerabilities in the physical layer and lower layers of the protocol stack, has received much less attention. As network originated exploits become more difficult it can be expected that more attacks will be mounted through the "air interface". The means to develop and mount such attacks are increasingly available with the proliferation of low cost software-defined radio (SDR) platforms and open-source software, and the ubiquity of potentially hackable wireless terminals. More research on this problem is needed to find solutions to be retrospectively applied to existing systems, influence the next generation of wireless standards, raise awareness of the potential problems, and train engineers to develop and embed defensive capability in radio standards and products. Crucial will be the ability to change the physical layer functionality, right to the antenna, by changing system software. This is not possible with current equipment or indeed envisaged in the 5G. Apart from countering the security threat, such technology will be needed to enable the future adoption of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA), in which, rather than frequency bands being administratively licensed to specific users, spectrum will be allocated dynamically according to evolving demand in space and time. The project partners, Toshiba Research, Roke, University of Bristol, and GCHQ, share a vision of Secure Wireless Agile Networks (SWAN) to be developed in this research partnership. The project scope will include technical deliverables; the shaping of policy and standards; and the training and career development of the SWAN teams. The co-created 5-year programme will integrate academic and industrial teams in activities that address the following Research Challenges (RCs). 1. Threat Synthesis & Assessment: how can RF interfaces be attacked, beyond the threats envisaged in their design? 2. RF Cyber Detection & Defence: techniques to detect RF cyber attack and mitigate their effects. 3. Cyber Secure Radio Design: designing radios whose RF characteristics can be updated in the field to deal with new threats, which also enable DSA. 4. Secure Dynamic Spectrum Access: enabling technology for securely sharing spectrum for most efficient usage. The consequences of not addressing the above will potentially make the wireless channel an Open Attack Surface for cyber attack. SWAN's technological solutions will place the UK at the forefront of enabling the fundamental parameters and architectures of wireless systems to be adaptable to new spectrum and interface specifications; resilient to accidental or induced failures (such as jamming); and resistant to cyber-attack.
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