The Role of Cognitive Experience in Decision and Action

We often fail to act in line with our beliefs. In a recent Associated Press poll, two-thirds of respondents say that an animal’s right to live without suffering is just as important as a person’s, yet only 4% of Britons are vegetarian or vegan despite believing that factory farming causes suffering. Most people are reluctant to drink from a cup labelled ‘poison’ even though they believe it contains lemonade (since they wrote the label and filled the cup themselves!) Many people fear flying and refuse to travel by air even though they believe it is safe. We need to explain why our beliefs are often unable to influence our behaviour. The idea that belief informs action has the status of philosophical orthodoxy as well as being central to common sense. When faced with these examples, philosophers have therefore been forced to add layers of complexity to their explanations of the role belief plays in action, appealing to complicated special conditions or even denying that subjects genuinely possess these beliefs at all. This project develops a new, simpler, and more successful approach based on the following insights: 1. What we believe and what seems true to us can come apart. (For example, whereas the belief that grass is green seems true, the belief that solid objects are mostly empty space does not.) 2. It is what seems true to us that drives our actions and decisions. This new approach can explain the frequent disconnect between our beliefs and our actions and decisions: if our beliefs don’t seem true to us (i) they won’t influence our everyday behaviour, and (ii) they will have far less influence over our effortful, theoretical decision-making than beliefs which do seem true. Moreover, if something seems true to us (iii) it will influence our behaviour and decision-making even if we don’t believe it. This leaves us particularly susceptible to online disinformation which is manufactured to seem true to us. Main Objectives: Develop a new theory of decision-making and action, revealing the essential role played by what seems true. Utilise this theory to explain the many cases where behaviour conflicts with beliefs. Reveal the extent and nature of the challenges posed by deliberately misleading online content, given that it has been designed to seem true to us. Confront these challenges through an exciting public engagement initiative: an interactive exhibition designed to promote better decision-making. Make an impact outside the academy by trialling a new approach to imposter syndrome, informed by our theory. Disseminate our findings widely to the relevant academic disciplines. Understanding that our actions depend not on what we believe but on what seems true promises to revolutionise strategies for implementing behavioural changes in ourselves and others, helping us to address pressing social challenges more effectively. It’s not enough to simply possess the belief that (say) factory farming causes suffering, or that climate change is real. If we want these beliefs to inform our actions, they need to seem true.